Background. In this study, we aimed to identify the effect of market-level risk factors on avian influenza (AI) infection in poultry and humans and generate evidence that will inform AI prevention and control programs at live bird markets (LBMs).
In the past 10 years, several Asian-lineage HPAI viruses produced fatal disease in poultry, wild birds, humans, and other mammals, and some have spread across 3 continents [1] . Affected countries and the international community have mobilized funds to assist in the control of the disease because of the potential of these viruses to develop into a global influenza pandemic [2, 3] .
Available evidence indicates that live bird markets (LBMs) can serve as potential hubs where avian influenza viruses (AIVs) are maintained and transmitted for long periods of time. After the emergence of HPAI H5N1 influenza in 2003, several studies have documented that LBMs could be sources of human AI infections [4] . The importance of LBMs in the transmission of AI to humans was also highlighted by the emergence of influenza A (H7N9) viruses of low pathogenicity to poultry in early 2013, causing human infections without preceding or concomitant outbreaks in poultry. Exposure to H7N9-infected poultry at LBMs has been implicated as the main risk factor for human infection [5] . During the fifth wave of influenza A (H7N9) from October 2016 to April 2017, an increasing proportion of human cases were related to poultry exposures in rural farms and backyard flocks [6] .
In the context of animal health, biosecurity is the application of management practices that aim to reduce the risk of the introduction and spread of disease agents within and between animal populations. At LBMs, these practices can include introducing rest days, limiting the number of poultry species sold at a market, the use of cleanable cages, and the deployment of adequate cleaning and disinfection procedures. Although some studies have demonstrated that biosecurity practices at LBM level are associated with reduced risk of AI infection, the relative efficacy of different LBM biosecurity practices at reducing the transmission of AI to both humans and poultry in the LBM setting is still unclear.
The role of farm-level biosecurity indicators, such as production, management, environment, and biological factors, in AI infection in poultry have been quantified in a recent study [7] . A recent systematic review and meta-analysis evaluated risk factors for clinical outcomes in H5N1 patients [8] . There were also systematic reviews of pathways of AI exposure at the animal-human interface, and meta-analyses estimated the prevalence of AI infection among humans and birds [9] . A previous systematic review assessed the impact of different interventions implemented in LBMs to control the infection of zoonotic influenza [10] . There is a need for similar studies to quantify the impact of relative efficacy of biosecurity measures on human (market workers) and poultry infection at LBMs. This information will allow national AI control program managers to make informed decisions on targeted risk-reduction strategies at LBMs and in this way to protect poultry, poultry workers, and consumers visiting LBMs.
In this study, we systematically reviewed and meta-analyzed the overall effect of different biosecurity indicators on AI infection from different studies, to understand more about how each risk factor influences AI infection at market level and to generate evidence that will inform AI prevention and control programs at LBMs.
METHODS

Search Strategy
Following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines, we performed a systematic literature search using PubMed, ISI Web of Science and Science Direct, CNKI (the China Academic Journals full-text database), and WANFANG database (includes most comprehensive online full-text Chinese medical journals) with no starting time limits, up to June 10, 2018. The search strategy used 4 PICO (participants, interventions, comparators, and outcomes) components (Supplementary Table 1) .
Eligibility Criteria
Epidemiological studies were included if they evaluated biosecurity risk factors for AI infection in LBMs in poultry, the environment, or human populations. Studies were excluded if (1) they were laboratory studies, descriptive studies, case reports, and vaccine efficacy studies, (2) the outcome recorded was not AI infections, (3) they were not LBM-based studies (ie, ecological studies, studies at local, regional or national levels, studies at farm level), and (4) there was no effect size for LBM biosecurity risk factors reported.
Data Abstraction for Market-Level Biosecurity Indicators
For each of the papers that met the inclusion criteria, we recorded information on subject title, first author, year of publication, country, language, subtype of AIV and its pathogenicity, total sample size, number of AI positives and negatives, risk factors, infection type, study type, and analysis methods. Data on biosecurity indicators were extracted by 2 independent reviewers (X.Z., R.J.S.M.), and a dataset based on these characteristics was created in MS Excel. In this study, we analyzed biosecurity indicators for poultry and market environment infection and market workers' infection (ie, nonsymptomatic seropositive) separately. A total of 34 biosecurity risk factors were explored in our study (Supplementary Table 2 ). For market infection, the following groups of biosecurity indicators were considered: (1) market characteristics: market type, market size, market location (rural or urban area), market location (central city or noncentral city areas) and presence of multiple species, presence of ducks, and presence of rabbits; (2) market biosecurity management: conduct cleaning and disinfection, before and after cleaning and disinfection, conduct waste disposal, conduct market closure, before and after rest day, ban on overnight storage, poultry sources, separate different species, and conduct slaughter in market; (3) seasonality, temperature, for market workers' infection; (4) sociodemographic characteristics: sex, age, years working in LBMs, type of market (wholesale or retail), vaccination history, and occupation; (5) activities involving exposure to poultry: conduct cleaning, conduct feeding, contact poultry, conduct slaughtering, defeathering, and evisceration.
Study Quality and Bias Assessment
Two authors (X.Z., R.J.S.M.) independently reviewed and assessed the quality of each English paper using a structured approach. Papers in Chinese were translated by X.Z. and evaluated by X.Z. and R.J.S.M. The quality of each study was scored on 7 quality assessment criteria (Supplementary Table 3 ). Studies that recorded a higher overall score were considered to superior quality. The scores from quality assessment were then rescaled into quality ranks between 0 and 1 by making them relative to the highest scoring study in the group; then, the best study was ranked 1 and those with lower scores were ranked lower. These ranks were then used by the quality effects (QE) model to adjust estimates of effect [11] .
Statistical Analyses
The odds ratio (OR) and 95% confidential interval (CI) of each biosecurity factor were extracted from each study, or if the OR was not reported, we calculated it using Epi Info 7.1.5.2 based on the raw data reported. When a factor was tested in both a univariable and multivariable model, the effect size of the factor in the multivariable model was used. The ORs of each factor were modeled by applying a QE meta-analysis model that assumed heterogeneity across the included studies [11] . The results of the analyses were statistically significant if the 95% CI did not include the value 1.
The QE model redistribution of weights due to the rescaled quality rank (called Qi in the MetaXL software described below) helps reduce estimator variance as well as allows for proper error estimation through the CI thus generated. Nevertheless, the random effects results are in Supplementary Figures 1-5 for comparison. All results are presented as a forest plot that shows individual OR estimates for each group of biosecurity indicators and overall for the category. We assessed study heterogeneity by the Cochran Q Chi-square test, and this is also used by the I 2 index statistic to estimate the proportion of total variation due to heterogeneity. An I 2 value of <25% indicated low heterogeneity, 25%-75% indicated moderate, and a score of ≥75% suggested high degree of heterogeneity. Publication bias was assessed using Doi and funnel plots. All analyses were conducted using MetaXL, version 5 (Epigear International, Sunrise Beach, QLD, Australia; www.epigear.com).
RESULTS
Search Results and Study Characteristics
Our literature search strategy yielded a total of 249 citations by searching PubMed, 554 articles from Web of Science (Web of Science Core Collection and MEDLINE), and 111 articles from Science Direct; we also found 269 articles from CNKI and 266 articles from the WANFANG database (Figure 1 ). After removing duplicates and applying inclusion and exclusion criteria, we finally included 79 articles for the systematic review and meta-analysis.
The 79 studies included in the analysis were published between 2003 and 2018. The studies were from 7 countries or regions including China mainland (65), China Hong Kong SAR (2), Vietnam (4), Bangladesh (4), the United States of America (USA) (3), Egypt (1), and Indonesia (1). Of the included 79 studies, 25 were in English and 54 were in Chinese; 69 studies investigated biosecurity indicators associated with market infection, 12 studies investigated biosecurity indicators associated with market workers' infection at LBMs, and, of that, 2 studies investigated on both poultry and poultry worker infections at LBMs (see Table 1 ).
Quality and Heterogeneity of Selected Studies
Quality assessments of studies included in the analysis is in Supplementary Tables 4 and 5. The quality scores of studies related to market infections ranged from 3 to 12 (median is 8, maximum possible is 13), and the scores of studies on market workers' infection ranged from 4 to 12 (median is 8, maximum possible is 13).
Our results indicate that overall studies within biosecurity Groups A, B, and C were highly heterogeneous (estimated I 2 values of 90%, 89%, and 96%, respectively) (see Figures 2-4) . Moderate heterogeneity was seen within Group D (I 2 values of 73%; see Figure 5 ). Very low heterogeneity was seen within Group E (I 2 value of 15%) (see Figure 6 ). Of the 79 studies on market infections, there were 60 longitudinal studies, 17 cross-sectional studies, and 2 case-control studies. A total of 32 studies investigated general AIV and specific subtypes (ie, H5 or H7 or H9, or their combinations), 23 studies investigated specific AIV subtypes, and 14 studies only studied general AIV. Given the heterogeneity of these studies in relation to the viruses being isolated, the focus of the papers was to report the effect of market level of biosecurity on AI infection and recovery generally. Of the 69 studies on market infections, 50 studies investigated only environmental samples in LBMs for AI virus, and 11 studies collected only poultry samples. Eight studies investigated both poultry and environmental samples, and only 1 study reported the results by sample type. For these reasons, we did not stratify our meta-analysis by type of biological sample (see Table 1 ). Among the 69 studies on risk factors of AI market infection, 64 studies used reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction to detect the AI virus, only 5 studies conducted virus isolations.
Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Live Bird Markets Biosecurity Indicators on Avian Influenza Market Infection
Market Characteristics (Group A)
The overall effect for optimal market characteristics associated with market infection was protective and statistically significant Markets that do not slaughter poultry onsite have lower risk than markets that slaughter onsite, although it is not statistically significant (OR = 0.54; 95% CI, 0.13-2.25).
Seasonality (Group C)
The overall effect of optimal seasonal indicators associated with market infection was protective but not statistically significant (OR = 0.98; 95% CI, 0.78-1.23) (Figure 4 ). Summer and autumn months pose a significant lower risk compared with spring and winter seasons (OR = 0.65; 95% CI, 0.44-0.96). 
Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Live Bird Markets Biosecurity Indicators on Poultry Workers' Avian Influenza Infection
SocioDemographic Characteristics (Group D)
The results indicate the human AI infection at LBMs was significantly lower in male workers than for female workers (OR = 0.68; 95% CI, 0.54-0.87) and significantly lower in wholesale markets compared with retail markets (OR = 0.38; 95% CI, 0.22-0.65). Market workers who did not sell poultry had lower risk of getting AI infection than those who sell poultry (OR = 0.70; 95% CI, 0.50-0.97).
Activities Involving Exposure to Poultry (Group E)
The overall effect of optimal exposure behaviors was significantly protective (OR = 0.37; 95% CI, 0.27-0.51) ( Figure 6 ). Our results revealed a significantly lower risk of AI infection in market workers who did not conduct cleaning of feed trays (OR = 0.34; 95% CI, 0.13-0.90) and who did not contact ducks (OR = 0.28; 95% CI, 0.12-0.64) compare with those that did. Market workers who did not slaughter poultry (OR = 0.12; 95% CI, 0.03-0.56), did not defeather poultry (OR = 0.19; 95% CI, 0.07-0.51), and who were not involved in poultry evisceration (OR = 0.19; 95% CI, 0.07-0.52) had significant lower risk of getting AI infections.
In addition to the risk factors reported above, there were several other different factors, which were assessed only by a single study (Supplementary Tables 6-10 ). These are not discussed due to the difficulty in interpreting the combined effect of these factors based on the small number of studies.
Publication Bias Assessment
The Funnel and Doi plots (see Supplementary Figures 6 and 7 ) demonstrated major negative asymmetry of effects for market characteristics and sociodemographic characteristics only. This is due to the heterogeneity of subgroups that belong to these 2 categories, although a paucity of negative studies cannot be excluded, thus leading to an exaggerated protective effect for factors in these categories.
DISCUSSION
Live bird markets are recognized to be reservoirs of AI viruses and a possible source of infection for both domestic poultry and humans working in or visiting them [12] [13] [14] [15] . To the best of our knowledge, this is the first meta-analysis of evidence on the effectiveness of market-level biosecurity in both poultry and human AI infections at LBMs. Our analysis of the relevant published English and Chinese research articles provided strong evidence in favor of biosecurity operations at LBMs that are protective for AI infections on both poultry and human infections at LBMs.
Our meta-analysis demonstrates that the odds of detecting AI viruses at LBMs is dependent on a select group of LBM biosecurity characteristics and management measures. Our finding that the presence of multiple poultry species, and presence of rabbits or ducks increased the risk of AI circulation in the LBM, compared with those with single species, can partly be explained by unsafe poultry movements by some traders. A previous study suggested that live poultry traders who sell more than 1 species are more likely to import birds from multiple sources and may also supply high-risk species, eg, wild animals or birds, without inspection or health checks [16] . The LBMs that are located in central city areas have lower risk than those in noncentral city areas, and this may due to the enhanced LBM management measures in the central city areas (eg, enhanced clean and disinfection, quarantine, etc) [17] and the massive trade and complex poultry source in the noncentral city areas [18] .
This suggests the risk of AI virus spread from the noncentral areas to the central areas; therefore, enhanced regulations should be emphasized in the noncentral city areas.
Cleaning and disinfection procedures are considered to be an important strategy to reduce disease transmission in LBMs, and our meta-analysis of existing evidence supports this view [16, 19] . In addition, our results revealed that the detection of AI viruses was always less right after market rest days when infectious load is less [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . Closing LBMs can largely eliminate human infection risk [27] . However, studies indicated that recovery of AI viruses can occur shortly after LBMs reopen, presumably after the introduction of AI-positive birds [28, 29] . Our study indicates that the combined effect of daily cleaning and disinfection and waste removal are effective ways of reducing AI transmission at LBMs [19, 30, 31] . We also found that LBMs that trade poultry from local areas have lower risk of AI infection compared with those that trade poultry sourced from other areas. Previous research indicates that poultry movements facilitate the transmission and spread of AI viruses between premises as a result of mixing of poultry from different sources and the increased opportunity for virus multiplication during transport [19] . The risk of AI transmission at LBMs posed by cross-regional and long-distance poultry movements could be managed by implementing a market-level traceability system that includes certification of sources of poultry based on their compliance with biosecurity requirements. We found that the risk of AI infection in markets that do not slaughter poultry onsite was lower compared with markets that slaughter poultry onsite [31, 32] . This suggests that poultry slaughter operations at LBMs increases the risk of AI transmission within the LBM environment presumably because of exposure to aerosols arising during the slaughter process where AI virus may be present in large quantities. Improvement of slaughtering and poultry processing operations at LBMs should be an area of investment from market operators through the implementation of standard operating procedures and good manufacturing practices that comply with standard health and safety regulations.
Our previous studies in southern China demonstrated that temporal variation in the intensity of poultry trade and production quantity of live poultry around the Chinese New Year festivities is associated with higher HPAIV H5N1 infection risk in humans and poultry. Our meta-analysis suggested that spring and winter seasons posed significantly higher risk of AI infection in the LBM environment compared with summer and autumn [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] . This seasonality effect is due, in part, to the fact that lower temperature and humidity can increase virus survival in the environment [4] . These findings demonstrate the need for heightened seasonal targeted surveillance at LBMs to maximize effectiveness.
Our results demonstrate that human infection at LBMs is dependent on important demographic and occupational hazard. The risk of human infection is higher in retail markets compared with wholesale markets, and this can partly be explained by differences in poultry handling operations within the 2 types of LBMs [40] [41] [42] . On one hand, wholesale markets are usually hubs in the poultry market chain where live poultry consignments from different farms congregate before sent to other locations, typically retail markets and less frequently slaughterhouses. Poultry handling activities in wholesale markets are limited compared with retail markets in that poultry remain in their cages or assigned area until they are loaded onto trucks on their way to retail markets. One study had noted that live poultry were slaughtered at retail LBMs daily, whereas many wholesale markets do not slaughter or have separate slaughter areas [43] . On the other hand, retail markets constitute the last step in the LBM chain, providing more time for virus to spread and multiply.
Furthermore, our meta-analyses indicate that activities that directly expose LBM workers to AI such as slaughtering, defeathering, and cleaning significantly increase the risk of workers AI infection [44] [45] [46] . These results are in line with previous observations that the risk of AI infection is greater in LBM workers who clean water containers [23] and those that conduct poultry evisceration with very limited personal protection measures [47] . Several studies have demonstrated that most commonly contaminated sites were located in the poultry slaughtering zone [22, 31] . There is recent evidence on detection of influenza virus in air samples from LBMs, especially with defeathering machines, and risk of airborne transmission [48] . These are all poultry handling activities primarily observed in retail markets, which further highlights the need for workers to wear personal protective equipment within retail LBMs.
There are important gender disparities between wholesale and retail markets because wholesale markets tend to be male dominated as opposed to retail markets where women share the poultry value chain with men. Our results indicate that female workers are at increased risk of AI infection compared with male workers [40, 46, 49] . This contrasts with the situation for H7N9 influenza in humans in the general population where older males are at greater risk than younger females [40] . These results may also reflect gender differentiation in tasks within LBMs, which put female workers at greater risk of AI infection compared with males. Future biosecurity strategies should account for gender differences in risk identified in our study, which could include raising collective awareness through information platforms that target women working at LBMs.
Interpretation of the findings of our study should be done in consideration with its "limitations". First, as with all meta-analyses, we were restricted to the data that could be obtained from written reports (all studies included in our meta-analyses were observational studies, given that randomized trials were not available). Second, whereas we meta-analyzed studies from different countries, this may overlook the heterogeneity in different study areas, although most of them (approximately 95%) were Asian countries. Third, we grouped different types of AIV (H5, H7, H9, etc); we believe that there will be commonality in spread and transmission in LBMs, whereas there are differences in the epidemiology among these viruses. Fourth, the estimates presented by the literature reviewed in this study on the effect of sociodemographic analysis of human infection in LBMs were often not adjusted, and none reported the interaction between variables. It is difficult to know how much the measured effect of biosecurity indicators could be due to confounding or effect modification; indeed, most effects reported in the studies are unadjusted, and on no occasion did studies explore the presence of effect modification between factors. Finally, we conducted the quality assessment, including several study characteristics, assuming study quality on a continuous scale, and this may not be necessarily the case, and our list of criteria is somewhat arbitrary; therefore, we also put the results from the random effect model in the Supplementary File.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, to minimize market contamination and poultry infection of AI at LBMs, control measures should be targeted to markets that sell and slaughter live poultry and markets with presence of multiple species. Strategies that include daily cleaning and disinfection, regular market closure, and waste disposal as well as an emphasis of inspection on cross-regional poultry movements should be put in place. Targeted surveillance programs for AI circulation in LBMs should focus on winter and spring months. Finally, LBM workers directly involved in market cleaning and poultry processing should be provided with occupational health and safety promotion programs, with emphasis on female workers at retail LBMs.
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